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ABSTRACT
We studya general equilibrium model where the multiplicity ofstationary periodic perfect foresight equilibria
is pervasive. We investigatethe extentof which agents can learnto coordinate on stationary perfect foresight
cycles. The example economy, taken from Grandmont (1985), is an endowment overlapping generations
model with fiat money, where consumption in the first and second periods of life are not necessarily gross
substitutes. Depending on the value of a preference parameter, the limiting backward (direction of time
reversed)perfect foresightdynamics are characterized by steady state, periodic,or chaotic trajectories forreal
money balances. We relax the perfect foresight assumption and examine how apopulation of artificial,
heterogeneous adaptive agents mightlearnin such an environment. These artificial agents optimize given their
forecasts of future prices, and they use forecast rules that are consistent with steady state or periodic
trajectories for prices. The agents’ forecast rules are updated by a genetic algorithm. We find that the
populationofartificial adaptive agents is able to eventually coordinate on steady state and low-order cycles,
but noton the higher-order periodic equilibria that exist under the perfect foresight assumption.
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1.1 Overview
The possibility of multiplestationary perfect foresight equilibria in certain classes of general
equilibrium models is now well established.’ Some of these stationary equilibria may be
steady states, but others can be periodic or evenchaotic. Standard general equilibrium the-
ory makes no prediction as to whichofthese many stationary equilibria might be achieved in
economies driven by actual human behavior. Many economists are presently trying to make
sense of this situation, often by arguing that some equilibria are more likely to be even-
tually observed than others, and therefore that these equilibria are the more relevant ones
for making predictions based on the model. One common approach involves replacing the
perfect foresight assumption with an adaptive learning scheme in order to determine which
of the multiplestationary equilibrium trajectories are stable under the learning dynamics.2
However, the use of learning as an equilibrium selection device has often been limited toex-
amples where the degree of multiplicity of stationary equilibria is not too severe. Moreover,
in cases where stationary periodic equilibria have been considered, the learning analyses to
date have typically been strictly local; the question of which among many equilibria would
be selected under a plausible global learning analysis remains largely open.3
In this paper, we implement a certain type ofglobal learning dynamicin a model that
sometimes possesses coexistent steady state, periodic and chaotic perfect foresight equilib-
ria. Our technique involves analysis of the dynamics generated by a population of artificial
adaptive agents. The environment is Grandmont’s (1985) endowment overlapping genera-
tions economy, in which there is a constant supply of fiat currency and where consumption
in the first and second periods of life are not necessarily gross substitutes. The model
supports two steady state equilibria: the Pareto inferior autarchic steady state, which is
characterized by a zero demand forfiat currency, and the Pareto optimal monetary steady
state, which is characterized by a positive demand for fiat currency. Under time separable
‘Fora survey, see Azariadis (1993). 2For asummary ofthis literature, see the surveys by Sargent (1993), Evans and Honkapohja (1992), and
Marimon and McGrattan (1992).
30f course, ifany typeof stationary equilibrium is locally unstable under aparticular learningdynamic, it
will remain globally unstable under the same learning dynamic, and can be thus be ruled out as a candidate
for long—run equilibrium.
1preferences, and provided that the value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion for the
old agents is high enough and that of the young agents is low enough, it can be shown that
stationary perfect foresight equilibria may also existin which the equilibrium dynamics are
characterized either as periodic or chaotic trajectories for real money balances, and that
these complicated stationary equilibria are also Pareto optimal. However, in such cases,
the forward perfect foresight dynamics are not well—defined, so that it is not clear that
there is a meaningful forward dynamic that could plausibly be assumed to converge to one
of these more complicated stationary equilibria. Thus while complicated perfect foresight
equilibria may exist in this model it is an open question whether or how such equilibria
might be achieved. Grandmont (1985) provided a complete analysis of the model under
the well—defined, backward (direction of time reversed) perfect foresight dynamics, and
demonstrated that the limit of these backward dynamics could be a complicatedstationary
equilibrium.
Our approach is to create a meaningful forward dynamic by relaxing the perfect fore-
sight assumption andexamining howaheterogeneouspopulation of artificialadaptive agents
might learn to forecast future prices in such an environment. Agents are differentiated (in
addition to birth dates) by the forecast rule they employ, andeach agent solves an optimiza-
tion problem based on an individual-specific forecast for the future price. Agents’ forecast
rules are updated by a genetic algorithm, a population—based, stochastic, directed search
algorithm that generates new rules while retaining and improving upon those rules that
have performed well in the past.4 We conduct computational experiments with economies
defined in this way and report the results.
We interpret genetic algorithm learning as a powerful representation of trial-and-error
learning which has important advantages over many other models in the literature. Among
these are that: (1) beliefs are initially heterogeneous across agents, (2) the information
requirements on agents are minimal, (3) the genetic algorithm offers a natural model for
experimentation by agents with alternative forecast rules, (4) the heterogeneity of beliefs
allows parallel processing to be an important feature of the economy, (5) genetic algorithm
learning has been shown in other research to successfully mimic the behavior of human
subjects in controlled laboratory settings, (6) the learning model can be applied even in
4For an introduction to genetic algorithms see Goldberg (1989) or Michalewicz (1994).
2complicated problems, and finally (7) the initial heterogeneity of the population allows us
to initialize the system randomly, sothat we are able to obtain some sense of the “global”
properties of our system under learning as opposed to the local analysis that is often em-
ployedin the learning literature.5 These features suggest to usthat genetic-algorithm-based
models of learning have interesting features from an economic standpoint, and that such
a model of learning will allow us to address the question of what type of behavior might
reasonably be expected to arisein an actual economy or economic situation with apervasive
multiplicity of stationary equilibria.
We report the results of 1,410 computational experiments. The experiments are orga-
nized around a single preference parameter: the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the
old agents (those in the second period of life). The relativerisk aversion ofthe young agents
(those in the first period of life) remains unchanged in all of the experiments. The main
finding is that the population ofartificial adaptive agents is able to coordinate their initially
heterogeneous beliefs so as to implement steady state or low—order periodic equilibria for
real moneybalances. For low values ofthe preference parameter, the artificial agents always
coordinate on the monetary steady state; in this case complicated stationary equilibrium
trajectories do not exist. However, as the preference parameter is increased, and the multi-
plicity ofstationary perfect foresight equilibriabecomes more pronounced, the population of
artificial agents frequently fails to coordinate on the cyclic equilibria that are picked out by
the limiting backward perfect foresight dynamics. Instead, coordination occurs on steady
state andperiodic equilibria that are of lower periodicitythanthe equilibria predicted by the
limiting backward perfect foresight dynamics. Thus our long—run outcomes under learning
tendto be simpler (lower order)than outcomes under backwardperfect foresight. However,
we alsofind that timeto coordination tends to increase with the relative risk aversionofthe
old agents over a large portion of the parameter space, and in addition, we findthat when
cycles exist our systems can display qualitatively complicated dynamics for long periods of
time before eventually converging to the relatively simple, low—periodicity equilibria.
We reachtwo mainconclusions based on these results. First, in the economies we study,
51n this paper, we use the term “global” to describe our analysis because it is based on a random
initialization scheme. We recognizethat ouranalysisisnot truly global,even computationallyspeaking, since
wedid not completemultiple experiments based on every possible initialization for agivenparameterization.
Such an approach is beyond the scope of this paper.
3the initially heterogeneous beliefs of the agents eventually give way, leading to a situation
where all agents coordinate on a perfect foresight equilibrium. Thus, our results suggest
that agents can achieve coordination even in relatively complicated situations. Second,
the stationary equilibria on which agents coordinate are always relatively simple — either a
steady state or alow order cycle — and are always Pareto optimal. Our results suggest that it
is difficultfor an economy comprised ofoptimizing agents with initially heterogeneous beliefs
to coordinate on especially complicated stationary equilibria, such as those characterized by
high—order periodicities, eventhough such coordination is adistinct possibilityin thismodel
a priori. On the other hand, we are unable to rule out coordination on periodic equilibria
entirely, and we find that the transient dynamics of our systems can be persistent and
qualitatively complicated if (and only if) stationary periodic equilibria exist.
1.2 Recent related literature
Several recent studies have focused on certain aspects of learning in general equilibrium
models closely related to those studied in this paper. Woodford (1990) analyzes the lo-
cal stability of stationary sunspot equilibria in an overlapping generations economy where
the sunspot variable follows a two-state Markov process. All agents in this economy use
the same forecast rule, which is a version of the Robbins—Monro stochastic approximation
algorithm. Woodford provides conditions under which a stationary sunspot equilibrium
is (locally) an attractor under this learning algorithm. Our results amplify Woodford’s
conclusion in a closely related model, in that, first, a stationary perfect foresight periodic
equilibrium of order two can be an attractor on the basis of our more global learning al-
gorithm and second, these deterministic periodic equilibria can be viewed as limiting cases
of the two—state stationary sunspot equilibria studied by WoOdford. While Woodford’s
stability conditions only generally apply to two—state, stationary sunspot equilibria, our
results go further, suggesting that higher order (periodicity greater than two) stationary
periodic equilibria are unlikely to be attractors. That is, while equilibria characterized by
high-order periodicities mayin principle be locallystable in an analysis such as Woodford’s,
they evidently have negligible basins of attraction relative to the space of definition of the
model in our analysis.
In a related study, Guesnerie and Woodford (1991) find conditions under which cycles
4will be stable under a learning dynamic in a one—step ahead forward looking model. In
their analysis, all agents form expectations according to a simple adaptive rule in which
the expected price is a convex combination of the actual and expected prices k periods
in the past. Guesnerie and Woodford (1991) conclude that cycles of any order might be
attractors under the learning dynamics in the systems they study, provided a condition
on the map describing the equilibrium conditions is met. When this condition is not met,
and such a possibility is shown always to exist depending on the nature of the equilibrium
map, their systems might converge to learning equilibria of the type studied by Bullard
(1994), limiting learning dynamics which are stationary but which are not perfect foresight
equilibria and which therefore involve forecast errors in perpetuity. The Guesnerie and
Woodford (1991) study suggests that a priori, the possibilities for the limiting learning
dynamics in our system are quite open. However, our learning model is considerably more
complex than one in which there is a simple adaptive learning rule used by all agents. In
a similar vein, Grandmont and Laroque (1986, 1991) as well as Grandmont (1985) study
general differentiable learning rules in one—step ahead systems and find conditions under
which these systems may or may not converge to cycles and steady states.6 Grandmont
and Laroque (1991) argue that it is easy to construct examples where the steady state of
an economic model is locally unstable under reasonably defined learning dynamics, while
Grandmont and Laroque (1986) and Grandmont (1985) suggest that periodic equilibria,
perhaps complicated, can be the ultimate outcome of similarly defined systems.
Evans and Honkapohja (1995) also study one step ahead forward looking systems,both
stochastic anddeterministic. They imagine that agents all useacertain recursive algorithm
to compute the expected value ofthe variable of interest as a function ofpast observations
on that variable. They assume that agents prespecify a value of k, the periodicity of the
local equilibrium, so that in each case, agents are assumed to know the periodicity of the
equilibrium they are attempting to learn. The Evans—Honkapohja analysis makes use of
the theory of recursive stochastic systems associated with Ljung (1977) and imported to
economic problems of this type by Marcet and Sargent (1989), and they also relate their
necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of equilibria in the learning dynamic to the
6See Grandmont (1994) for a survey of this literature.
5concept of expectational stability as formulated in Evans (1989)! The Evans—Honkapohja
conditions suggest that local stability under learning will depend on the properties of the
map describingthe equilibrium conditions, and that in principle it is possible to have many
equilibria which are (strongly E-) stable in the learning dynamics, so that while recursive
learning might reduce the set of equilibria regarded as plausible actual outcomes, it cannot
in general suggest a unique equilibrium. However, the case studied in the present paper is
somewhat special in this regard in that Grandmont’s (1985) example involves a unimodal
map with a negative Schwartzian derivative, which in turn implies that a single periodic
equilibrium among many will be (strongly E-) stable in the learning dynamics according to
the Evans—Honkapohja analysis. The monetary steady state will also be (weakly E-) stable
in the learning dynamics in this case, so that Evans and Honkapohja conclude that the
equilibrium actually observed would depend on the exact specification of the learning rule
used by the agents, in particular whether the rule is consistent with asteady state or with a
stationary periodic equilibrium of order k.8 In our model, agents’ learning rules are always
consistent with steady state and stationary periodic equilibria of many different orders.
We know of no research that analyzes stationary periodic equilibria such as those we
are interested in under genetic algorithm learning. However, research on genetic algorithm
learning by Arifovic (1994c) and Arifovic and Eaton (1994) does focus on coordination
problems that can be severe. Arifovic (1994c), for example, analyzes genetic algorithm
learning in the Kareken andWallace (1981) model of exchange rates, in whichthe exchange
rate is indeterminate in the sense that any fixed exchange rate e E (0,oo) is a rational
expectations equilibrium. Arifovic (1994abc) alsoshowsthat the dynamics from experiments
with human subjects compare favorably to dynamics generatedin the same economies with
genetic algorithm learning.
While experiments with human subjects are beyond the scope of this paper, we are
enthusiastic about testing the predictions of our genetic algorithm learning model against
7Forasurvey of this topic, see Evans and Honkapohja (1992). 8Evans, Honkapohja, and Sargent (1993) make a very different argument in the context of the same
overlapping generations model analyzed in this paper. They suggest that if a significant fraction of the
population uses misspecifled models because they view themselvesas participating in an economy driven by
random processes, and these agents attempt to optimize against forecasts generated by using the uncondi-
tional distribution ofpast prices, then the possibility ofstationary periodic equilibria will be eliminated. In
the present paper, agents have heterogeneous beliefs but theexistenceofperiodicequilibriais not threatened.
6such a benchmark. Van Huyck, Cook, and Battalio (1994) have performed an experiment
with human subjects in a repeated coordination game that shares some of the properties of
the model studied in this paper. In particular, their coordination gamehas two strict, pure
strategy Nash equilibria, one of which is an interior equilibrium. This interior equilibrium
is shown to be stable under myopic best response learning dynamics provided that the
game’s payoff parameter falls within a certain range; otherwise the myopic best response
dynamic leads to periodic or chaotic trajectories that cycle about the interior equilibrium.
The authors consider an experimental treatment where the payoff parameter lies either
within the range that assures stability of the interior equilibrium under the myopic best
response dynamic or lies far enough outside this range so that the myopic best response
dynamic converges to a period seven cycle. They find that, in contrast to the predictions
of the myopic best response dynamic, subjects always learn over time to coordinate on the
interior equilibrium, even in the parameterization where the best—response dynamics would
imply that the interior equilibrium is unstable (and the period seven cycle is stable). We
view these laboratory results as complementary to the findings we present in this paper,
because in both papers agents fail to coordinate on relatively high order cycles. However,
we differ from Van Huyck et al. (1994) in that the environment we consider sometimes
displays a dense set of periodic equilibria. We also note that in the overlapping generations
environment that we study, the complicated trajectories that agents are attempting to
coordinate on are equilibrium trajectories, whereas the period seven cycle in the Van Huyck
et al. (1994) experiment arises from the use of the disequilibrium, best response learning
dynamic.
Experiments with human subjects that have been conducted in an overlapping gener-
ations environment similar to the one studied in this paper include Marimon and Sunder
(1993, 1994, 1995), and Marimon, Spear, and Sunder (1993), with the latter paper being
the one most closely related to this paper. Marimon, Spear, and Sunder (1993) study a
two—periodoverlapping generations economy with preferences andendowments such that a
period two perfect foresight equilibrium coexists with the monetary steady state.9 Subjects
make predictions of future prices, and, analogous to our set up, the optimal level of real
money balances is computer generated for each subject given their price prediction. The
9No higher order perfect foresight periodic equilibria exist.
7number of subjects in a generation ranged from 2 to 5, while the number of new generations
(iterations) ranged from 27 to 67. The design oftheir experiment issomewhat different from
ours in that the authors systematically varied the size of the incoming generation (say: 3,
2, 3, 2, ...) in their experiments as a means of inducing real variation in the equilibrium
price level for the first phase of the experiment, and then subsequently kept the generation
size constant to see ifthe subjects might learn to coordinate on the period two equilibrium
once cyclicality in expectations had been established. In the experiments with changing
population sizes (real shocks), they also employed a sunspot variable by alternating the
color of some of the information presented on subjects’ computer screens such that the
sunspot was perfectly correlated with the real shock. The sunspot variable was left on at
all times, even when the real shock was turned off, and agents were not informed of the
presence of real shocks. The authors’ main finding is that in treatments where there were
real shocksin the initial phase and sunspotsthroughout, prices continued to displaymarked
periodicity of order two even after the real shock was turned off. In treatments without real
shocks in the initial phase (but with sunspots), subjects always learned to coordinate on
the monetary steady state. The authors conclude that it is possible for human subjects to
learn to coordinate both on steady state and on period two equilibria. These results match
up well with our own, as our genetic algorithm based learning model predicts that both
steady state and period two equilibria will be observed as long—run outcomes in a similarly
specified economy. Furthermore, their time series for the price level (Figure 3, p. 89) are
qualitatively similar to those generated in our computational experiments, eventhough our
systems had neither real shocks nor a sunspot variable. Finally, these authors argue that
equilibrium selectionwould appear tobe path dependent, since periodic price dynamics were
only observedwhenthere were real shocksin the initial phase. We note that our model also
predicts that equilibrium selection will be path dependent. By conducting a large number
of computational experiments, we are able to let conditions develop spontaneously that in
certain instances led our system to converge to a period two equilibrium, while Marimon,
Spear, andSunder (1993) needed inducements in the form ofthe real shocksinorder to avoid
conducting a prohibitively large number ofexperiments.’0 Indeed, the major advantage of
‘°Insubsequent research, Marimon and Sunder (1995) observed two experimental overlappinggenerations
economies where inflation realizations were persistently cyclical in the neighborhood of a monetary steady
state ofthe model. These two economies were not subject to any real shocks, and there were no stationary
8our computational approach is that we are able to conduct many more experiments with
many more iterations across awider variety of economies, and thus obtain amore complete
picture of the long-run outcomes that might reasonably be expected in environments like
this one.
Computational experiments with evolutionary algorithms (such as geneticalgorithms) in
economic settings have been suggested by Holland andMiller (1991) and Sargent (1993) and
have been performed by Axelrod (1987), Miller (1989), Marimon, McGratten, and Sargent
(1990), Binmore and Samuelson (1992), Andreoni and Miller (1993), Arthur (1994), Rust,
Miller, and Palmer (1993, 1994) and Wright (1995) among others. These applications have
generally not been in competitive general equilibrium environments like we have in mind.
An exception is the work of Arifovic (1994abc).
2 The environment
The example economy is taken from Grandmont (1985). Time is discrete with integer
t E (—oo, oo). There is asingle, perishable consumption good and a constant supply of fiat
money M > 0. There are ~ agents per generation, where N is the total population alive
at time t. Agents live fortwo periods, and can save between periods by holding fiat money.
Agents receive strictly positive endowments of the consumption good in each period of life,
{e,,e2 }. Preferences are given by:
— c~(t)’P’+ ct(t + 1)1_1~~2
— ‘—P1 1P2
where P1, P2 E (0,oo) denote the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the young and old
agents, respectively. The notational convention is that subscripts denote birthdates while
real time is recorded in parentheses, so that cj(j) denotes the timej consumption of the
agent born at time i.11 The agent born at time t maximizes utility subject to the pair of
budget constraints
Ct(t) ~ e~ — st(t),
periodic equilibria in the neighborhood of the steady state. The observed cyclic behavior for inflation was
attributed to the stability of the adaptive learning system that subjects were thought to have used; the
linearized learning system, evaluated at the monetary steady state, hadeigenvalues that were complex, with
modulus close to, or equal to one.
“While in principle there are many agents born at time t, we do not distinguish among them in this
section.
9c~(t +1) ~ e2 + P~+1)st(t),
where 5t(t) denotes the amount the agent born at time t chooses to save at time t, and the
price of the consumption good in terms of fiat money is denoted by P(t). Combining the
first order conditions with the two budget constraints, one obtains:
c~(t)+ ~(t)(Ph/P2)/3(t)(C021)IP2) = e
1 + e2J3(t) (1)
where /3(t) = P~-)I) denotes the gross inflation factor between dates t and t + 1. It fol-
lows from the compactness of the budget set and the strict concavity of the utility function
that the young agent’sconsumption decision, ~j(t), and therefore his savings decision, st(t),
are uniquely determined. Since a closed form solution for ct(t) is unavailable, we will in-
stead rely upon numerical methods to obtain ct(t). Once the optimal consumption and
savings amounts are determined, it becomes possible to define a perfect foresight equilib-
rium sequence for prices (equivalently, for real money balances) usingthe market clearing
condition:
S(t)=~
where S(t) is aggregate savings at time t. Using this condition, and the fact that the
supply of fiat money M is constant, one can derive a first order difference equation that
characterizes all perfect foresight equilibria in this economy:
P(t) = S(t)P(t + 1).
Following Grandmont (1985), let us write this difference equation more compactly as:
P(t) = ~(P(t + 1)). (2)
A perfect foresight equilibrium is any sequence of prices {P(t)} that satisfies equation (2).
A steady state equilibrium is a price level7~ such that ~ = ~ It is well known (see,
e.g., Gale (1973)) that in this model, there can be at most two steady state equilibria, one
in which aggregate savings is zero and agents consume endowments, and possibly another
in which aggregate savings is positive and the steady state gross rate of return on savings
and its reciprocal, the steady state gross inflation factor, are both equal to unity. In the
analysis that follows, we choose an endowment sequence which guarantees that this latter
equffibrium exists, thatis, that we have the Samuelson case in Gale’s terminology.
10As Grandmont (1985) demonstrates, these two steady states are not the only stationary
equilibria that this economy maypossess. If theoffer curve is sufficiently backward bending,
or equivalently, ifthe coefficient ofrelative risk aversion of the old agents, P2, is largeenough
while the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the young agents, p~,is less than or equal
to unity, then in addition to steady states, the set of equilibria may also include periodic
as well as chaotic equilibria.’2 Our focus in this paper is limited to the steady state and
periodic equilibria that may arise in this environment. A periodic equilibrium of order k
consists of a sequence of k prices, ~ such that ‘~ = ~ j = 1,2,...k,
where 4’~denotes the kt~~ iterate of the map ‘Ii. Grandmont (1985) noted that the forward
perfect foresight dynamics, that is, iterates of the map (1), may not be uniquely defined
depending on the properties of the map ~(.). Grandmont (1985) studied this system by
limiting attention to the backward perfect foresight dynamics, that is, sequences of prices
that solve the map (1) with the direction oftime reversed. Aperiodic equilibrium oforder k
in the backwardperfect foresight dynamics is a sequenceof k prices {75k,i~~_i, ..., P, } of the
map ~ such thati~= ~ j = 1,2, ..., k. Grandmont’s (1985) well—knownmain result
was to show that periodic equilibria of any order andchaos could exist as long-run outcomes
in the backward perfect foresight dynamics without abandoning the classical assumptions of
utility maximization and market clearing.’3 At least forperiodic equilibria,this is enough to
proveexistence of complicatedequilibrium dynamics inthe moremeaningful forward perfect
foresight system, because even though the forward dynamics are not uniquely defined,it is
at least in principle possible that agents would choose appropriatelyin the forward system so
as to replicate the trajectory uniquely definedin the backwardperfect foresight dynamics.’4
In Grandmont’s (1985) model, when periodic equilibria exist, they coexist with other
equilibria, and in particular, they coexist with steady states. Sarko~3kii’s(1964) theorem
impliesthatifa periodic equilibriumoforder threeexists, thenequilibriaofeveryotherorder
q, where qi san element of the set ofpositive integers, also exist. This raises the question of
which among these many stationary equilibria might be achieved, and Grandmont (1985)
‘2Similarly, Benhabib and Day (1982) demonstrate thepossibility ofperiodic andchaotic equilibria in the
“Classical” versionof this samemodel where the time patterns ofendowments and preferences are reversed.
‘3The periodic equilibria in Grandmont’s model can be viewed as deterministicversions ofsunspot equi-
libria first studied by Shell (1977) and Azariadis (1981).
‘4While in principle there are many agents born at time t, we do not distinguish among them in this
section.
11addressed this question by considering the limiting backward perfect foresight dynamics
and arguing that plausible learning rules exist that would, if used by all agents, cause
the system to be locally convergent to the periodic equilibria isolated under backward
perfect foresight. In particular, Grandmont (1985, Proposition 3.2, p. 1012) interpreted
a stationary equilibrium that was stable in the backward perfect foresight dynamics as
stable in the forward learning dynamics, and Grandmont gave conditions on a differentiable
learning rule under which such statements would be true.
In Figure 1, we replicate Grandmont’s (1985, p. 1030) Figure 4, which is a bifurcation
diagram in the backward perfect foresight dynamics. In this example, which we will use
throughout the remainder of the paper, {ei,e2} = {2, .5}, and the relative risk aversion of
the young is fixed at P1 = .5. The figure shows a plot of real money balances per capita,
which can range between zero and the first period endowment of 2. For each value of the
parameter representing the relativerisk aversion of the old agents, p2, the backward perfect
foresight mapwas iterated 1000 times, using as an initialcondition the peakofthe unimodal
map. The last 50 of the 1000 iterations are plotted in the diagram. As the relative risk
aversion parameter is increased, a standard period-doubling bifurcation pattern emerges,
with the limiting backward perfect foresight dynamics being the monetary steady state
for low values of the risk aversion parameter and a periodic equilibrium of order three for
high values of the risk aversion parameter. Between these extremes, the limiting dynamics
involve cycles of mostly higher order, or perhaps of a very high order or even chaos, in
which case the plot of the last 50 iterations is inadequate to characterize the equilibrium.
Qualitatively, however, the figure is clear.
We now want to consider relaxing the perfect foresight assumption and introducing
genetic algorithm learning into this s3~~em.
3 Learning
3.1 Representation ofa heterogeneous population
At every date t, there is a finite population of N agents participating in the economy. The
population is the same at every date and is equally divided between agents born at time t
and those born at time t — 1, so that the size of each generation is ~. Each agent in the
12population is differentiated by a forecast rule for next period’s price level. This forecast
rule completely characterizes the agent’sbehavior in both periods of life, because the agent
takes the optimal action (makesthe optimal savings decision) based on the forecast of next
period’s price produced by his own forecast rule. This forecast rule is represented by an
integer value k e [0,~].The rule is to use the pricelevel that was realized k±1 periods in
the past as the forecast of next period’s price level. For example, consider ayoung agent i,
born at time t, who has chosen k~.If we let F,’[P(t + 1)] denote agent i’s time t forecast of
the price level expected to prevail at time t + 1, we can write agent i’s forecast rule as:
F[P(t+1)J=P(t—k~—1).
This specification of the forecast rule is simple, but has the important implication that each
young agent i can make optimal savings decisions in any type of stationary equilibrium
of order q, so long as q E [0,k + 1]. In fact, we chose this specification precisely because
it allows agents to adopt behavior consistent with steady state or periodio trajectories for
prices up to the limit k+ ~~15We note that this class of forecast rules is more general than
it might first appear. While one could allow agents to use past data in more complicated
ways, perhaps eveneconometricallysophisticated ways, for our exerciseto be interesting the
forecast rule must ultimately allow the agent to behave in a way consistent with any of the
equilibria of the model (up to some limit). In particular, ifthe economy is in an equilibrium
with periodicity q~ k+ 1, the forecast rule chosen must deliver a forecast consistent with
that equilibrium.’6 If it does not, then the agents cannot coordinate on that equilibrium.
For this reason, we think that it is reasonable to abstract from the question of how agents
manipulate the data and concentrate on specifying a class of rules such that agents can in
principle coordinate on any of the equilibria of the model up to some limit.’7
In order to apply the genetic algorithm, we must first encode each agent’s forecast rule
as a string of length £, with elements of the string chosen from the binary {O, 1} alphabet.
For example, if £ = 8, the string might be 00100101. This string value can be decoded to
~ the same reason other researchers who have studied the stabffity of cycles under learning, e.g.
Guesnerie and Woodford (1991) and Evans and Honkapohja (1995), have also assumed that agents form
expectations based on prices that prevailed k periods in the past.
‘6This is therequirement that theforecast rule be able to detect the cycle discussed by Grandmont (1985)
and Grandmont and Laroque (1986).
‘7For a discussion of the issue of how agents manipulate the data to derive forecasts see, e.g. Bray and





00000001 1 steady state, 2-cycle
00000010 2 steady state, 3-cycle
00000011 3 steady state, 2-cycle, 4-cycle
00000100 4 steady state, 5-cycle
00000101 5 steady state, 3-cycle, 6-cycle
11111111 255 steady state, 2-cycle, ..., 256-cycle
Table 1: Most strings are consistent with more than one stationary equilibrium.
the base 10 integer 38, which is the k-value that this agent uses in forecasting future prices.
Thus, this agent would usethe actual price level that was realized k + 1 = 39 periods ago,
(i.e. P(t — 39)) as the forecast of next period’s price level. Of course, ifthe economy had
beenin asteady state for each of the past 39 periods, then this forecast rule would give the
same predicted price as the string 00000000. In fact, all strings representing integer values
k E [0, k} are consistent with a steady state equilibrium, and many are also consistent with
periodic equilibria of other orders. The nature of this situation is described in more detail
in Table 1.
3.2 How forecasts are used
Given the young agent i’s time t forecast of the price level expected to prevail at time t+1,
F,~[P(t + 1)], we can denote this same agent’s forecast of the gross inflation factorbetween
dates t and t +1 by:
— fl[P(t + 1)]
,8~(t) — P(t)
Using this forecast forgross inflation, the computer algorithmthen numerically solvesequa-
tion (1) for agent i’s consumption amount 4(t). The young agent i’s savings decision is
given by s~ (t) = e1
— 4(t). Aggregate savings at time t is therefore given by:
N/2
S(t) = ~s~(t).
14The lawof motion for the price level P(t) in the forward dynamics of our learning model is
given by:
P(t) = S(t_1)P(t - 1),
and thus P(t) is determined once S(t) is known. However, the quality of the time t young
agents’ forecasts cannot be evaluated until period t+ 1, whenS(t + 1) and thus P(t + 1) is
known. We now turn to a discussion of how we evaluate and update forecast rules.
3.3 Updating forecast rules using a genetic algorithm
While both the genetic algorithm and the overlapping generations model have some rather
obvious biological overtones, we do not interpret our model of learning as one of a strict
passing of genetic information from onegeneration to the next. Instead, weview the genetic
algorithm as a convenient device with which to model communication among individual
agents aliveat date t. We imagine that agents who willenter the productive portion oftheir
life at time t + 1 (that is, agents who will be young next period) have had conversations
with some of the older agents alive at time t and have devised forecast strategies based
on these conversations.18 The result is a new generation of agents—the newborns . The
newborns become the next generation of young agents once the agents in the model are
aged appropriately. Because we create the newborn generation at time t and allow these
newborn agents to enter their productive livesat time t+ 1, we can make use of the entire
set of genetic information available at time t to create the new generation. That is, we can
allow the newborns to converse with any of the agents participating in the economy, young
or old, at time t. Accordingly, we subject the entire population of N strings available at
time t to the four genetic operators that make up the genetic algorithm, and create the
newborn generation from this information. We now describe our implementation of these
four operators: reproduction, crossover, mutationand election.
3.3.1 Reproduction
To create the newborn generation at time t, we begin by calculating the fitness of each
string in the entire population of N agents alive at time t. First, each string is decoded
to determine its forecast rule. Next, the forecast rule is applied using the history of prices
‘8See Arifovic (1994b) and Bullard and Duffy (1994) for asimilar interpretation.
15available through time t — 1, and a price forecast is determined. The reason for restricting
the forecast rule to the history of prices availablethrough time t — 1 is that this restriction
enables us to assess how well the forecast rule would have performed had it been in use in
the previous period. Performance is measured in terms of the two period, lifetime utility
that the agent would have attained had the agent been young in the previous period and
possessed the forecast rule in question. In assessing the lifetime utility value, we use the
most recent realization of the gross inflation rate j3(t — 1) = P(t)/P(t — 1). Thus, the
lifetime fitness value is a measure of the accuracy of a particular forecast rule; the higher is
the lifetime fitness value, the more accurate is the forecast rule that was used.
Once the fitness values have been determined, we conduct one selection tournament for
each of the newborns we wishto create. Eachtournament consists of a random selection
of two strings, with replacement, from the finite population of all N strings aliveat time t.
The string with the higher fitness is copied and put into the group of newborn strings. This
process means that the higher fitness strings of the existing population tend to get copied
into the newborn generation.’9 Although we now have a set of newborn strings, we are
not finished, since we want to allow the newborn agents to experiment with new possible
forecast rules which may not be part of the genetic information set available at time t. The
next three operators accomplish the task of introducing new information into the system.
3.3.2 Crossover, mutation and election
The main idea of the crossover and mutation operators is to create new forecast rules by
mixing portions of existing strings together and by changing individual bits with small
probability. Accordingly, we randomly pair the newborn strings. Then for each pair we
perform the crossover operation: with some probability p’~ > 0, wedivide the pair ofstrings
at some randomly chosen point, s E [1,1 — 1], where £i sthe length of each bit string, and
swap the bits to the right of the crossover point. With probability 1 — p’~ we do not apply
the crossover operation to the pairof strings. As an example, suppose that we haveapair of
strings of length £=8 and that crossover is to be performed on these two strings. Suppose
19The tournament method of implementing the reproduction operator of the genetic algorithm has some
advantages over the “biased roulette wheel” methodology found in Goldberg (1989) and many other early
genetic algorithmimplementations. SeeFogel(1994) or Michalewicz (1994) for adiscussion. For atheoretical
analysis of tournament selection, see Blickle and Thiele (1995).
16alsothat the randomly chosen point is s 6. The pair of strings are divided at this point:
010100111
111001101




The two resulting strings (even incases where thetwo strings were not changed by crossover)
are then subjected to some mutation: we consider each bit value b = 0, 1 of the two strings
that result from the crossover operation, and with some probability pm > 0w ereplace the
bit, b, with the bit 1 — b. With probability 1 — ptm, the bit value is not mutated.
We refer to the strings that result from crossover and mutation as alternatives, because
wethink ofthe newborns (strings selected throughreproduction) as contemplating adopting
some alternative forecast rules that may not be in use in the current population. In the
standard, “biological” application ofthe genetic algorithm, these alternatives would simply
become the newborn generation, but such an approach is lessthan satisfactory in economic
applications where agents are appropriately viewed as making intelligent choices. In partic-
ular, the standard application of the genetic algorithm would allow our alternative strings
to enter the population even if they are not strictly better (in terms of fitness) than the
newborn strings from which they were created. But we want to think of our economic deci-
sion makers as being somewhat less naive. Therefore, we adopt Arifovic’s (1994a) election
operator: each pair of newborns is compared with the corresponding pair of alternativeb.
Of the four strings, only the two with the highest fitness values are allowed to remain in
the generation of newborns, and the other two are discarded. Fitness of the alternatives is
computed in the same way as it is in the reproduction operator. The crossover, mutation
and election operators combined can be interpreted as a method of allowing new forecast
rules to enter the system without forcing agents to adopt rules that are unlikely to yield
high utility.2°
20The election operator is properly viewed as a modification ofthe selection/reproduction operator ofthe
17The reproduction, crossover, mutation and election operators have a simple economic
interpretation. Being ‘born’ in this economy means leaving one’sformativeyears and enter-
ing the productive portion of one’s life. These newborn agents just leaving their formative
years initially have no plans for the future—they are ‘blank slates.’ They acquire the fore-
cast rule they will need by communicating with a few other members of society, those either
one or two generations ahead ofthem. This communication is modeledvia the reproduction
operator. In our implementation, each newborn agent communicates with two randomly
selected members of the society. The newborns evaluate the forecast rules that belong to
these two older agents by calculating how much utility the rules would have delivered had
they been in use one period in the past. Each newborn then copies the forecast rule of the
two that would have delivered the most utility. This completes the first step in attaching a
forecast rule to each of the incoming members of the society. Butthe newborns communi-
cate further when they talk with each other andcontemplate alternative forecast rules that
might not be in use in the society at that time-that is, the newborns conduct a mental
experiment with other possible forecast rules. This additional communication is modeled
via the crossover and mutation operators. In our implementation, the newborns are paired
and each pair creates two alternative forecast rules by combining partsof theirexistingrules
into two new possibilities, and also by randomly changing small parts of the recombined
forecast rules. The two alternative forecast rules are evalutated to see how much utility
they would have delivered had they been in use one period in the past. Alternatives which
improve upon the newbornsexisting forecast rules are adopted, while alternatives which do
not are discarded. This last step is modeled using the electionoperator. Thus the incoming
generation learns from the experience of the agents older than themselves and also can be
innovative in introducing new forecast rules into the societ~’
Once the election operator has been applied, and a generation of newborn agents has
genetic algorithm. Inthe genetic algorithmliterature, a distinctionis frequently madebetween pureselection
procedures and elitist selection procedures. See, for instance, Grefenstette (1986) or Rudolph (1994). In a
pure selection procedure, strings are chosen for reproduction based solely onprinciples of natural selection.
Elitist selectionprocedures involve twosteps. First,pure selection is performed. Second, the elitist procedure
stipulates that the best discovered string, either before or (in our case) after reproduction, always remains
intact into the next generation. Thus, our reproduction operator, together with our election operator,
comprise an elitist selection procedure. Rudolph (1994) has shown that an elitist selection procedure is
necessary, though not sufficient for the genetic algorithm to converge asymptotically to one of the perfect
foresight equilibria of the model.
18been chosen, time advances to the next period. The time t population of newborn agents,
created via reproduction, crossover, mutation and election, becomes the young generation
alive at timet+1. The generation of young agents alive at time t becomes the old generation
alive at time t+1. The generation of old agents alive at time t ceases to exist. The forecasts
of the time t + 1 young generation are determined, their savings decisions are calculated,
andthe aggregate savings amount S(t+1) then determines the price level P(t+1) according
to the law of motion for prices P(t + 1) = s~±i)P(t). The genetic algorithm is then begun
anew. The algorithm ends wheneither a convergencecriterion (described below) is satisfied
or the algorithm has reached the maximum number of iterations (generations) allowed.
3.4 Some advantages of genetic algorithm learning
We interpret genetic algorithm learning as a useful model of trial-and-error learning in a
heterogeneous agent economy. This learningmodel has many important advantages relative
to other models in the literature. First, beliefs are initially heterogeneous across agents,
a feature not often modeled in the learning literature to date.21 Second, the information
requirements on agents are minimal, as they only needto know their own utility and their
ownforecast rule in order to make a decision. Third, the genetic algorithm offers a natural
model forexperimentation by agents with alternative forecast rules, an important charac-
teristic of learning also rarely modeled in competitive general equilibrium environments in
the literature to date. Fourth, the heterogeneity of beliefs allows parallel processing to be
an important feature of the economy. That is, some agents are trying one forecast rule while
other agents are trying other forecast rules, with the better forecast rules propagating and
the poorerones dying out. We think this isclosely akinto what goes on in actual economies,
where communication among agents encourages successful strategies to be quickly copied
and unsuccessful ones to be discarded. Fifth, the approach to learning we study can be ap-
plied even in complicated problems such as the one studied in this paper. And finally, the
initial heterogeneity of the population allows us to initialize the system randomly, so that
we are able to obtain some sense of the “global” properties of our system under learning as
opposed to the local analysis that is often employed in the learningliterature. We thinkthat
21For an alternative approach to systems with heterogeneous learning rules, see Evans, Honkapohja, and
Marimon (1994).
19these features provide good reasons to investigate the properties of genetic-algorithm-based
models of learning in systems where learning may have an important role to play. In the
present model the potentially important role for learning is equilibrium selection.
We chose to use agenetic algorithm, rather than some other learning/search algorithm,
because the genetic algorithm has a number of attractive features that are particularly
well-suited to the particular problem that we examine. First, unlike other search/learning
algorithms, the genetic algorithm is population-based, and involves parallel processing of
a finite set of initially heterogeneous strings; each of these strings can be viewed as rep-
resenting different candidate solutions to a particular optimization problem, or, as in our
interpretation, each string can be viewed as representing the belief of a different agent in
the population. The population—based genetic algorithm can be regarded as aglobal search
algorithm whereas “representative—agent” type search algorithms are necessarilylocal. The
implicit parallelism of the genetic algorithm also works to reduce computation time as com-
pared with enumerative search strategies and other search algorithms. As we have stressed,
we think parallelism is an important feature of coordination in actual economies or eco-
nomic situations. Second, the genetic algorithm is readily applied to difficult optimization
problems sometimes heuristically described as “rugged surfaces.” Unlike gradient—based
learning algorithms, (e.g. the Robbins-Monro or the least squareslearning algorithms stud-
ied by Woodford and Marcet and Sargent or other hill—climbing algorithms), the genetic
algorithm does not require the taldng of derivatives. This feature makes the genetic al-
gorithm an attractive model of how populations of economic agents might update their
forecastrules over time in highly nonlinear environments such as the one we consider here.
Third, genetic algorithms are known to behave as excellent function optimizers. Holland
(1975) has shown that genetic algorithms optimize on the trade-off between searching for
new rules — exploration — and utilizinginformation discovered in the past — exploitation.22
Optimization of this trade-off is important: an algorithm that engages in too much explo-
ration discards feedback information early in the search that may prove useful, while an
algorithm that engages in too much exploitation is prone to local hill-climbing and may
be overly sensitive to noise. Finally, modelling learning behavior using a genetic algorithm
22HoUand’s “schema theorem” is proved by analogy with the two armed bandit problem and is found in
Holland (1975, pp. 75-88). See also Goldberg (1989, pp. 28-33).
20has the advantage that the exact specification of the problem that agents are attempting
to solve is known at the outset. Indeed, the representation of the agent’s problem is a
necessary prerequisite to the application of the genetic algorithm. Thus, interpretation and
evaluation of the results from applying the geneticalgorithm become relatively straightfor-
ward. In contrast, neural networks and genetic programming techniques evolve structures
and programs that are often difficult to interpret.
For all of these reasons, we chose the genetic algorithm over several alternative methods
as a way of modelling learning behavior. This is not to say that other methods are not
interesting, but only to note that the genetic algorithm approach has a number of desirable
features.
3.5 Design ofcomputational experiments
We conducted a set of 1,410 computational experiments using the genetic algorithm do-
scribed above in Grandmont’s example economy. We used the same set of parameter values
used to generate Figure 1, namely {ei, e2} = {2, .5}, and P1 = .5. The preference parameter
P2 was initially set equal to 2 and was then increased to 16 by increments of .1. We set the
bit string length £ = 8 which allows the agents to take actions consistent with a periodic
equilibrium of an order as high as 256,23 We set N = 100 (so each generation consistedof
N/2=50 agents), pC = 1 and ptm
= 1/t? = .125; we chose these values based in part on the
optimal values recommended by Grefenstette (1986) and Back (1993) and inpart because
the election operator that we use assures that strings that emerge from crossover and mu-
tation with particularly low fitness values will not enter the population, and so little is lost
by allowing agents to experiment extensively with alternative strings.
For each of the experiments, we created an initial population of 50 old and 50 young
agents randomly (that is, each bit in each string was set equalto 1 with probability .5 and 0
with probability .5). We initialized prices by choosing 256 random numbers froma uniform
distribution on the unit interval. We then repeatedly applied the genetic algorithm and
computed market clearing prices until either convergencewas obtained or 2,000 generations
had failed to coordinate on an equilibrium (that is, after 2,000iterations).
23With this choice for £, we are explicitly ruling out the possibility of agents coordinating on periodic
equilibriaof order greater than 256. Experiments with higher values oft, not reported here, did not appear
to produce qualitatively different behavior in our systems.
21Convergence was checked after each iteration of the algorithm using the following con-
vergence criterion. We checked for cycles of every possible periodicity, and we required that
the most recent ten prices matched the ten corresponding prices that occurred k+1 periods
in the past (k E (0,255)) up to a tolerance of 1 x 10b0.24 This criterion was met before
the 2,000 iteration limit in most of our experiments. This criterion is relatively easy on
high-order equilibria, since we check only ten prices on those cycles, but nevertheless we
did not observe high-order equilibria.
Once convergencewas obtained or the maximum number of iterations was reached, the
same experiment was repeated again nine more times, so that we have ten experiments
for each of the 150 values of P2 and a total of 1,410 experiments. For each iteration of
each experiment, we recorded several pieces of information: the price, the gross inflation
rate, and the mean value ofreal balances held by agents in the young generation. We also
recorded the mean base ten value of the strings, which we called mean position number, as
well as the standard deviation of the position number. If the standard deviation is zero,
then the strings are identical. We stress that our convergence criterion was price-based, so
that the fact that strings are identical does not imply that the system has converged. As we
will show, we sometimes found that strings were identical before prices met our convergence
criterion.
~Our specific convergence criterion is described by the following pseudo code:
convergenceyes
tolerance 1 x 10_b
for s=1, s~ maxcycle =256
for j=0, j9











The main finding from our set of computational experiments is that in the economies we
study, the artificial agents eventually learn to coordinate on stationary perfect foresight
equilibria of Order k + 1, where k = 0, 1 or 3, and where k 0 refers to adegenerate cycle,
the monetary steady state. None of the economies we studied displayed coordination on
stationary equilibria of any other periodicities. We never observed the nonmonetary steady
state. We conclude from these results that simplicity may be a virtue for equilibria, as
simpler equilibria are more likely to be achieved in our systems.25 As mentioned in the
introduction, our finding that artificial adaptive agents tend to coordinate on relatively
simple equilibria is consistent with experimental findings with human subjects in similar
environments studied by Van Huyck, Cook, and Battalio (1994) and Marimon, Spear, and
Sunder (1993).
Asecond, related finding is that our systems under learning rarely chose a single equi-
librium from among the many possible equilibria as the only limit point. Instead, formost
values of ~, our systems sometimes converged to one stationary equilibrium, the monetary
steady state, and sometimes converged to another stationary equilibrium, a period two cy-
cle. In one case, the learning system hadnearly converged to aperiod four cycle, andin two
other cases the system had not converged to anypath resemblingan equilibrium after 2,000
iterations. We conclude that while the introduction of learning into our economic systems
can sharply limit the set of equilibria that might be considered reasonable in the sense that
~theymight be achievable even in systems where the decisions are made by humans, the
introduction of learning does not imply a unique stationary equilibrium, and there is no
guarantee that convergence will even occur in finite time.
A third broad finding is that while our systems almost always converged eventually,
they sometimes displayed qualitatively complicated dynamics for very long periods of time.
By complicated dynamics we mean that either the price dynamics do not appear to be
in a small neighborhood of any discernible equilibrium path, or that they are in such a
250ne could view this as a “strong stability result” in Evan’s (1989) sense because it is robust to “over-
parameterization,” meaning in our case that agents consider higher order cycles even though none exist for
low values ofp~,
23neighborhood, but the path involves higher order periodic motion. These complicated
“transient” dynamics sometimes occurred in a region of the parameter space where cycles
exist in the backwardperfect foresight dynamics, but never occurred in the region where the
monetary steady state was the lone efficient equilibrium. Thus, whenthe set of equilibria is
relatively complicated, the coordination problem is more pronounced and the economy may
remain out of equilibrium for long periods oftime. We will provide examples of complicated
transient dynamics in the next section.
4.2 Specific results
In most cases, our systems did not converge to the same stationary equilibrium chosen by
the limiting backward perfect foresight dynamics studied by Grandmont (1985). For low
values of p2, in particular those below 4.2, we observed convergenceto the monetary steady
state in every experiment, and this is the same prediction made by the limiting backward
perfect foresight dynamics (see Figure 1). But as p~is increased further, the limiting
backward perfect foresight dynamics displaya bifurcation, with the monetary steady state
losing stability and never regaining it for values of P2 > 4.2. In contrast, in our systems
with learning, the monetary steady state was always a limit point in at least one of the
ten experiments conducted at each value of P2. In addition, for higher values of P2 and in
particular those past the first bifurcation point in the backward perfect foresight dynamics,
our systems often converged to a period two stationary equilibrium, even in cases where
that equilibrium too had lost its stability in the backward perfect foresight dynamics. Other
relatively simple periodic equilibria, such as the period three cycle that is stable in the
backward perfect foresight dynamics for values of P2 > 13, appear not to be attractive in
our learning dynamics, as they were never observed in our computational experir~ients.26
The raw data from all of our 1,410 experiments is summarized in a table in the Ap-
pendix. Looking at this table, one will notice that we encountered numerous cases of
nonconvergence, in the sense that our convergence criterion had not been met within the
allotted 2,000 iterations, and that these cases were especially common for higher values of
P2~Nevertheless, we regard most of these cases as near convergentsituations (rather than
26We note that the “relatively simple equilibria” we observed all had aperiodicity that is one of the first
few entries in Sarkovskii’s ordering. Since three is the last entry in that ordering, one might view it as a
“complicated” equilibrium.
24cases of nonconvergence), since in every instance save two the system was very close to
converging to aperiod two stationary equilibrium. If the experiments had been continued
beyond the upper limit of 2,000 iterations in these cases, we have little doubt that our
convergence criterion would have eventually been met, and that the system would in fact
have converged to a period two equilibrium. Generally, we found that when our systems
converged to the monetary steady state, they spent relatively few iterations in the imme-
diate vicinity of this steady state value, by which we mean that the last ten prices were all
equal up to five significant digits. In contrast, when our systems converged to a cycle of
period two, they often spent several hundred iterations in asimilar immediate neighborhood
of the equilibrium before finally meeting our convergence criterion. Since this process of
locking on to the period two equilibrium often took a long time, it is not surprising that
our 2,000 iteration limit was often encountered in these cases.27 This situation might have
been helped somewhat by a less stringent tolerance.
The specific convergenceresults from our experiments can be seen by comparing Figure
2, in which we plot the limiting dynamics of our adaptive learning system for each value
of P2, with Figure 1, which plots the limiting backward perfect foresight dynamics for each
value of P2. There are slight differences in the methods used to construct these two figures.
Figure 1 replicates Grandmont’s (1985, p. 1030) Figure 4, and plots the last 50 of 1,000
iterations ofthe backward perfect foresight system for each value ofp2, taking as the initial
condition the peak of the unimodal map. Figure 2 plots the fixed points of any of the
stationary equilibria to whichthe system under our adaptive learning algorithm converged
in any ofthe ten computational experiments completedat agiven valueofp~.If the learning
system failed to meet the convergence criterion within the allotted 2,000 iterations, then
the last 50 of the 2,000 iterations were plotted.
As an example, consider Figure 2 for the value ~ = 5. Some of the ten experiments
conducted for this value of p2 resulted in convergence to the monetary steady state, while
others resulted in convergence to the period two cycle that is predicted by the limiting
backward perfect foresight dynamics (see Figure 1) ~28 Therefore, there are three fixed
2~’The 2,000 iteration limit was chosen in order to conserve on the amount of computer time it took to
complete our computational experiments.
28Tbe exact number oftimes the algorithm converged to a particular type of equilibriumcan be found in
the table presented in the Appendix.
25points plotted in Figure 2 for P2 = 5. The middle point corresponds to the steady state
value for real money balances while the outer two points correspondto the stationary two—
cycle values for real money balances. As one can see from Figure 2, the outcome of the
ten experiments performed for P2 = 5i sthe same outcome observed for virtually all other
values of P2 > 4.2; in some experiments the learning system converged to the monetary
steady state, while in others the system converged to a stationary, monetary period two
equilibrium. A comparison between Figures 2 and 1 conveys the relative simplicity of the
set of long—run equilibria under learning as opposed to that set under backward perfect
foresight. The exceptional cases in Figure 2 occur for a single computational experiment
each when P2 = 4.7, P2 = 7.5 and P2 = 12.1. In the first and third of these cases, the
system did not approach anything resembling an equilibrium in 2,000 iterations, and the
corresponding plots of the last 50 iterations show no clear pattern in Figure 2. In one
experiment where p2 = 7.5, the system finished 2,000 iterations very close to a period 4
stationary equilibrium, and the last fifty iterations in this case are also plotted in Figure
2.~
The fact that there was wide variation in the number of iterations to convergence can be
observedinFigure 3, whichdepictsthe meannumber ofiterationstoconvergence foreach set
of the tencomputational experimentsconducted foreach differentvalue of P2. In caseswhere
the system failed to converge within 2,000 periods, the number of iterations to convergence
included in the sum used to calculate the mean is 2,000. Thus, the reported mean number
of iterations to convergence underestimates the actual mean number of iterations it would
havetaken the system to achieve convergence, had the system been allowed to continue in
those experiments where nonconvergence results were obtained. In the figure, there is a
noticeable spike in the mean number of iterations to convergence near the first backward
perfect foresight bifurcation point at around p~ = 4.2 (cf. Figure 1) as well as near (less
obviously) the second and third bifurcation points. Thereafter, as ~ is further increased,
the bifurcations occur more and more frequently and the mean number of iterations to
convergence shows a marked tendency to increase up to the point where p,~ = 13. At this
point, the limiting backward perfect foresight dynamics of Figure 1 indicatethe presence of
29~ in other cases of “nearconvergence” where the systemwas close to converging to a period two cycle
after 2,000 iterations, we are quite confident that this single run that is very close to a period four cycle at
2,000 iterations would eventually have met our convergence criterion.
26a period three cycle, and thus, via Sarkovskii’s (1964) theorem, periodic equilibria of every
order qexist, where q is an element ofthe set ofpositive integers. In this complicated region,
there is a markeddecrease in the meannumber of iterations to convergence. This decrease
is due to the increased tendency of the learning system in this region to coordinate on the
monetary steady state outcome rather than a period two or higher order cycle. As the data
in the table found in the appendix reveal, coordination on the steady state outcome tends
to increase for values of P2 > 13. When the system converged to the monetary steady state,
the number of iterations to convergence was generally less than when the system converged
to a period two equilibrium.
Figures 4abcdillustrate furtherthe character ofour results by examining time series from
experiments which converged or nearly converged. Figure 4a is typical of all of our 1,410
experiments, as weobserved outcomes similar to thisone at virtually all values of P2’ In the
figure, real balances per capita is plotted on the vertical axis. We recorded real balances per
capita for each iteration ofeach experiment, as it provides asummary ofthe agents’ savings
behavior at each point in time. However, it is important to note that only in a stationary
equilibrium, possibly periodic, when all agents within a generation are saving the same
amount, does the amount of real balances per capita accurately represent all individual
behavior in the economy. Figure 4a illustrates a case of fairly rapid convergence, with the
monetary steady state obtaining to within our convergence tolerance in 51 iterations.
Figure 4b is representative of another common outcome in our computational experi-
ments. In this case, real balances per capita moves to within a small neighborhood of a
period two equilibrium within 100 iterations, but then the system takes another 250 iter-
ations before converging at iteration 353. This latter result was typical, as it took a long
time for our systemsto lock on to period two equilibria. One consequence of the fact that
the system remains in the neighborhood of the period two equilibrium for such a longtime
is that beliefs continue to evolve long past the point where the system initially enters the
neighborhood of the equilibrium. This is illustrated in Figure 4c, which plots the time series
of the mean position number (the mean base ten value of all of the strings in the system) for
the same experiment depicted in Figure 4b. The mean position number can range between
zero and 255, and in the figure the position number initially falls rapidly and converges to
27one, which is a string consistent with a period two equilibrium.30 Of course, many other
strings are also consistent with aperiod two equilibrium (in particular, any odd string), and
when the system still has not converged according to our criterion at iteration 150, some
agents begin to experiment with some of these alternative strings. Subsequently, the mean
position number rises until it reaches a relatively high level by the time of convergence.31
A portion of the time series graph for an exceptional case is presented in Figure 4d.
This time series was generated in a single replication of a computational experiment with
P2 = 7.5. In this case, the agents in the economy nearly coordinated on a stationary
equilibrium of period four although again our convergence criterion was not quite met in
this case at iteration 2,000. The system depicted in the figure moved to a neighborhood
of a period two equilibrium by iteration 440, but all agents had coordinated on the string
00000011 which has base ten value 3 and is consistent with both a period four and a period
two equilibrium. We observed dynamics qualitatively similar to those in the firstportion of
Figure 4d ina number of other experiments, but in those cases the period four equilibrium
broke down during the volatile period which occurs around iteration 700 in Figure 4d.
The fixed points of the period four equilibrium correspond precisely to those of the cycle
predicted by the limiting backward perfect foresight dynamics (compare the fixed points of
Figure 4d with the limiting backward perfect foresight dynamics in Figure 1 at p2 = 7.5).
This caseillustrates that athird type of equilibrium, a period four cycle, is possible despite
being rarely observed.
Figures Sabcdillustrate situations of more complicated dynamics. Figure 5a and Figure
Sb displaythe full time series forthe two exceptional caseswhere no convergenceor nearcon-
vergence was observed after 2,000 iterations.32 As the time series reveals, the agents never
come close to coordinating on any path for real money balances that discernibly resembles
a steady state or periodic equilibrium.33 Nevertheless, the observed nonconvergence of the
30The standard deviation of the position number fell to zero between iterations 80 and 150, indicating
that all the strings were identical over this period. Nevertheless, the differences in price realizations must
not have been small enough to satisfy the convergence criterion.
31We did not observe continuing evolution ofbeliefs in cases where the system converged to the monetary
steady state. In most instances, the agents simply coordinated on the zero string, 00000000, in these cases.
In somecases the system tracked a damped oscillatory path to the steady state, with all agents coordinated
on the string 00000001 or occasionally on a string with ahigher position number. 321II these figures, lines connecting adjacent observations have been omitted in order to reduce clutter.
331n Figure 5a, the dynamics are bounded by the fixed points of the period two equilibrium which is the
attractor under backward perfect foresight for p2 = 4.7.
28system after 2,000 iterations does not implythat the system would not eventually converge.
Our experience leads us to believe that the system would eventually have converged to
some type of equilibrium if it had been allowed to run for more than 2,000 iterations, but
of course the question remains open.
A much more common outcome was one of complicated transient dynamics within ex-
periments that did eventually converge or that nearly converged. Figure 5c provides a
portion of the time series from one experiment. In this diagram, the mean position num-
ber is plotted above the box marking the level of mean real balances for cases where the
standard deviation of the position number is zero (indicating that all agents have coordi-
nated on a single string).34 From iteration 175 through 350, a favored string is evidently
00011010. This string is consistent only with a periodic equilibrium of order 23 and this
equilibrium has not yet occurred in the Feigenbaum cascade depicted in Figure 1. The
result is anear—periodic time series which continues for more than 500 iterations. Figure 5d
illustrates how a sharp qualitative change in dynamics can occur. In this experiment, the
level of real balances per capita hasbeen fluctuating without approaching an equilibrium for
more than 800 iterations. A favored string is 01011110. Around iteration 960, the system
dynamics change abruptly and the system approaches the steady state before convergingto
a period 2 equilibrium. A precise assessment of ‘complicated transitory dynamics’ requires
further quantification, but we think we can convey the nature ofour results by stating that
dynamics qualitatively like those in Figures Sc and 5d were commonplace in our experi-
ments, but never occurred for values of P2 < 4.2. We conclude that existence of periodic
equilibria is necessary but not sufficient for complicated transient dynamics in our systems
with learning.
5 Conclusion
We have studied learning in a model where there can be an extensive multiplicity ofsta-
tionary equilibria, many of whichare periodic. It is often thought that introducing learning
into such a model might help with the pervasive multiplicity problem because some of the
34We note again that astandard deviation ofzero does not imply that our convergence criterion has been
satisfied; recall that we also require the differences in price realizations must be less than the prescribed
tolerance.
29equilibria might not be attractors under learning and hence might not be viewed as likely
long—run outcomes in an actual economy or economic situation driven by human behavior.
In this paper, we have provided some evidence in favor of this notion, as introducing the
criterion that equilibria should be ‘learnable’ does lead to a sharp reduction in the set of
stationary equilibria one would view as plausible in our systems. However, we are unable
to rule out convergence to periodic equilibria entirely, and our systems sometimes display
qualitatively complicated transitory dynamics for long periods of time.
Experiments with human subjects might provide some further clarification of which
equilibria are more likely to emerge in environments like this one. However, as noted in the
introduction, genetic learning like that employed here has already been shown to be quite
successful in mimicking the behavior of human subjects in controlled laboratory settings,
and our results are consistent with the experimental work to date on this topic. Since
experiments with humansubjects are not presently feasible on the scalecontemplatedinthis
paper, we think our computational approach provides a reliable and practical alternative.
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A Data from computational experiments
In this appendix wepresent asummary ofthe raw data from ourcomputational experiments.
The first column in the table lists the value ofp~, while thesecond columnliststhe number of
experiments run at that value of P2. The third colunm gives the mean number of iterations
to convergence for those experiments which produced convergence at the given value of
P2, and the fourth column gives the standard deviation. The last three columns give the
number of experiments that converged to a steady state (k = 0), a stationary equilibrium
of period 2 (k = 1), and failed to converge in 2,000 iterations (nc). As discussed in the text,
we regard all but three of these non—convergent (nc) cases as instances of near convergence
to acycle ofperiod 2. Ofthe remaining three nc cases, one was nearly convergent to a cycle















2.1 10 36.9 7.2 10 00
2.2 10 28.4 5.1 10 00
~3 10 32.0 7.4 10 0 0
2.4 10 31.9 6.4 10 00
2.5 10 32.0 6.0 10 00
2.6 10 31.0 5.4 10 00
2.7 10 33.7 8.6 10 00
2.8 10 29.5 4.5 10 00
2.9 10 32.8 8.7 10 00
3.0 10 50.9 45.3 10 00
3.1 10 51.2 35.1 10 00
3.2 10 53.6 41.0 10 00
3.3 10 45.0 42.2 10 00
3.4 10 57.0 57.0 10 00
3.5 10 67.1 64.5 10 00
3.6 10 158.4 118.6 10 00
3.7 10 140.1 274.6 10 00
3.8 10 73.3 113.9 10 00
3.9 10 195.4 162.4 10 00
4.0 10 149.6 236.9 10 00
4.1 10 499.8 556.1 10 00
4.2 10 34.1 4.9 70 3
4.3 10 187.6 313.1 8 2 0
4.4 10 292.2 263.6 5 5 0
4.5 10 181.7 186.4 6 4 0
4.6 10 146.0 171.0 7 3 0
4.7 10 214.4 391.9 72 1
4.8 10 219.6 291.5 9 1 0
4.9 10 38.4 11.7 10 00
5.0 10 137.4 165.2 7 3 0
5.1 10 271.0 417.7 82 0
5.2 10 91.8 120.1 8 2 0
5.3 10 263.9 389.7 73 0
5.4 10 237.9 240.4 55 0
5.5 10 155.7 165.9 6 4 0
5.6 10 189.0 180.7 64 0
5.7 10 296.3 370.7 73 0
5.8 10 247.6 317.1 7 3 0
5.9 10 219.5 191.7 46 0
36p2 Replications Mean Std. Dev. k =0 k = 1 nc
6.0 10 265.2 368.5 55 0
6.1 10 126.0 171.5 73 0
6.2 10 373.4 387.4 55 0
6.3 10 72.5 104.0 9 1 0
6.4 10 246.4 309.4 55 0
6.5 10 126.3 196.8 7 3 0
6.6 10 194.4 252.5 64 0
6.7 10 145.7 175.9 7 30
6.8 10 135.5 190.1 82 0
6.9 10 159.0 248.1 82 0
7.0 10 481.4 269.2 28 0
7.1 10 442.8 367.2 46 0
7.2 10 253.3 280.4 64 0 -~:~a- 10 37.5 11.1 10 00
7.4 10 359.1 395.4 64 0
7.5 10 341.6 403.2 63 1
7.6 10 550.6 613.7 73 0
7.7 10 174.9 282.6 82 0
7.8 10 526.1 452.9 46 0
7.9 10 561.5 445.3 4 60
8.0 10 232.7 325.6 82 0
8.1 10 209.3 352.8 9 1 0
8.2 10 482.0 553.6 73 0
8.3 10 531.2 413.1 46 0
8.4 10 294.8 394.1 82 0
8.5 10 451.2 499.5 64 0
8.6 10 638.8 499.8 46 0
8.7 10 678.3 527.1 4 6 0
8.8 10 445.4 553.5 64 0
8.9 10 200.4 272.2 82 0
9.0 10 628.5 520.1 5 5 0
9.1 10 458.2 520.6 73 0
9.2 10 624.1 695.8 64 0
9.3 10 889.8 582.8 36 1
9.4 10 165.1 348.0 9 1 0
9.5 10 568.1 691.7 64 0
9.6 10 916.5 372.6 28 0
9.7 10 661.5 781.0 64 0
9.8 10 808.3 726.0 54 1
9.9 10 647.3 629.4 S 50
37P2 Replications Mean Std. Dev. k 0 k 1 nc
0 10.0 10 409.5 509.0 7 3
10.1 10 69.7 100.1 10 00
10.2 10 548.8 600.7 5 4 1
10.3 10 751.4 679.8 6 4 0
10.4 10 728.9 671.4 44 2
10.5 10 683.1 730.4 5 4 1
10.6 10 629.4 680.9 5 4 1
10.7 10 911.1 757.8 4 5 1
10.8 10 687.8 664.9 5 4 1
10.9 10 520.1 551.6 7 30
11.0 10 627.0 817.5 63 1
11.1 10 1097.7 727.7 3 70
11.2 10 305.6 429.9 7 1 2
11.3 10 1132.9 758.9 3 6 1
11.4 10 1078.7 686.2 36 1
11.5 10 940.6 771.6 45 1
11.6 10 507.7 738.8 5 2 3
11.7 10 1030.9 814.1 46 0
11.8 10 926.6 788.4 45 1
11.9 10 635.2 804.5 73 0
12.0 10 824.9 843.4 54 1
12.1 10 312.5 562.2 5 1 4
12.2 10 190.1 402.5 9 1 0
12.3 10 108.0 74.3 30 7
12.4 10 588.9 813.9 S2 3
12.5 10 785.3 842.8 43 3
12.6 10 81.9 66.7 8 02
12.7 10 918.0 817.6 44 2
12.8 10 53.4 16.3 50 5
12.9 10 528.6 724.8 62 2
13.0 10 311.7 518.4 8 11
13.1 10 322.3 587.0 8 11
13.2 10 251.7 540.3 8 11
13.3 10 50.6 10.6 8 02
13.4 10 228.0 519.5 8 11
13.5 10 249.4 569.6 8 11
13.6 10 296.8 597.2 7 1 2
13.7 10 234.9 681.9 9 1 0
13.8 10 224.0 491.8 7 1 2
13.9 10 198.9 288.7 90 1
38P2 Replications Mean Std. Dev. k = 0 k = 1 nc
14.0 10 43.0 11.2 90 1
14.1 10 78.1 68.9 90 1
14.2 10 85.0 105.4 80 2
14.3 10 93.1 97.7 90 1
14.4 10 119.0 194.2 80 2
14.5 10 45.1 23.5 80 2
14.6 10 131.9 238.7 90 1
14.7 10 44.9 13.1 80 2
14.8 10 47.7 26.4 90 1
14.9 10 147.3 287.4 90 1
15.0 10 59.3 38.8 90 1
15.1 10 73.4 57.4 90 1
15.2 10 189.4 307.4 90 1
15.3 10 46.7 12.7 90 1
15.4 10 100.4 132.4 90 1
15.5 10 77.9 71.5 80 2
15.6 10 316.7 654.3 6 1 3
15.7 10 63.2 17.9 5 05
15.8 10 112.3 173.8 9 0 1
15.9 10 42.0 11.6 60 4
16.0 10 178.1 332.8 7 0 3
39Figure 1
Bifurcation diagram, backward perfect foresight dynamics
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iCases of nonconvergence counted as 2,000 iterationsFigure 4a
Example of convergence to the monetary steady state
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Relative risk aversion of the old agents Is 5.6, computational experiment 1.1Figure4d

























jReiatlve risk aversion of the old agents is 7.5, computational experiment 6.1Figure 5a
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Relative risk aversion ofthe old agents is 10.4, computational experiment2.
Mean position number.above box when coordination obtained.